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Negotiation Principles: In Law or
World Affairs
Charles P. Taft*
EGOTIATION" IS A SUBJECT seldom taught in law schools. ItN should be part of every law school curriculum-as a re-
quired course. Every lawyer soon learns, in active practice, how
important it is.
There are certain principles of sound negotiation (or "dicker-
ing," in colloquial speech) that every lawyer should know-or
anyone engaged in any profession, business or enterprise, for that
matter. These principles apply almost exactly alike to a negotia-
tion involving a legal action or to one involving national or in-
ternational frictions-to settlement of a personal injury claim,
or a dispute between the United States and Russia. For example,
a negotiator never should let the other party know that he can
make the final decision. Always leave leeway for consulting the
"home office." This maxim applies to a settlement of a legal claim
or of an international dispute.
We lawyers are (or should be) part of the process of en-
larging the area of understanding talk and cooperative action be-
tween both sides in a dispute, by clarifying the facts of their
relationship. We do not always ourselves negotiate, but we are
all around the fringes of it, and negotiation is, or should be, the
major part of that enlarging process. The other major part is
living together under the contract. The way they live together
is a principal illumination of our judgment.
So it is that comparable negotiation and accommodation in
living together likewise apply to international relations.
Because I want to relate it to our own experiences, I begin
at home. When I went to school and college and law school, no-
body taught me anything about dickering. When I paid for any-
thing, there was a fixed price usually marked on it, though per-
haps marked down.
* Of Cincinnati; former Mayor, Prosecutor, etc., and now City Councilman
of Cincinnati; distinguished lawyer, writer, governmental, and diplomatic
service expert; formerly and presently chief in many civic, church, legal,
business, and other organizations.
(EDrOR's NoTE: This is a revision of extracts from a speech delivered very
recently to the Annual Spring Alumni Luncheon of Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.)
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When I spoke at the dedication of the new Yale Law School
eleven years after my graduation, I complained bitterly that they
had given me no training in what I found I needed frequently in
law practice, namely some idea of how to dicker. The complaint
did not really register for another ten or fifteen years. They have
a course now in negotiation, and there are at least a few text
books. But negotiation is no part really of the formal education
of most people, even lawyers.
I developed during this same period a growing interest in
compromise, but I found that my efforts sometimes shocked some
good friends of mine in the ministry. Finally, I induced them to
see that laymen may frequently find themselves faced with
choices between limited alternatives, and there are times when
all the alternatives could be bad. Firing the girl in the reception
room or the square peg in the round hole farther up-this is the
most unpleasant task there is. The head of an organization may
be faced with a question of conscience on policy. Does he keep
one of his assistants and prejudice the organization, or fire him?
So I succeeded in getting my National Council of Churches
Department of Church and Economic Life to work on a paper on
compromise, not as an evil thing, but as a problem of life. A
theologian did a draft in which he stated eloquently that laymen
and clergy were sometimes faced with choices like those I have
described, and that it would be their duty as Christians to make
a choice of the lesser of two evils. I turned the page, and he
wrote, "Of course, he should realize that in doing so, he is com-
mitting a sin."
That I will not take; and some good theologians agree with
me. Certainly we must, in making the choice, realize that we
have hurt someone, perhaps ourselves, and be very conscious
that we must try to bring the world around us to the point where
such choices are not limited only to alternatives that are unde-
sirable. But it is not sin, except perhaps in the vicarious sense of
missing the ideal mark.
And we need to be a little humble about our own convictions.
As Cromwell said in a famous debate in 1647:
Truly we have heard many speaking to us: and I cannot but
think that in most that have spoken there hath been some-
thing of God laid forth to us; and yet there have been several
contradictions in what hath been spoken. But certainly God
is not the author of contradictions.
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Compromise makes you analyze your real convictions.
Analysis of our real convictions along with the facts is even more
necessary in foreign relations. The risk of receding from an es-
sential principle of our lives is far greater, and the recovery far
more difficult than in legislative negotiations among ourselves,
for instance, or in a collective bargaining operation. But the need
still is for accommodation (or "compromise") on a basis that
helps to preserve the peace and prevent an accidental toe-
stubbing toward a deadly holocaust. In seeking this objective,
we cannot afford a sterile absolutism that says, Nyet! in English.
Our "ideology" says that we can never deal with the Russians
because they cannot tell the truth and never have kept an agree-
ment. They are determined, we say, to conquer the world by force
or subversion. The first requirement is to meet them, stand up to
them, and talk back to them.
Does our actual experience justify the idea that there can be
no area of maneuver without giving up basic convictions? Have
we ever changed positions and found we had not lost anything?
Have foreign nations, especially the Russians, ever yielded in
negotiations, or kept an agreement?
Their record is bad. Joe Johnston of the Carnegie Endow-
ment put together ten years ago some eight or ten examples that
bear this out fully and completely. We got nowhere even after
a pretty firm-looking agreement. As the Vice President said at
Fordham:
Even more impressive than [Mr. Mikoyan's] mental ability
and shrewdness were certain intangible qualities-a steel-like
toughness of character and an almost arrogant faith that his
cause was right and that it would inevitably prevail. In this
man there was no flabbiness, no softness, none of the un-
certainty of the pragmatist seeking a philosophy. He had
found in the Communist system the inalienable truth and
neither facts nor arguments could shake his faith ...
But we were able to negotiate a cessation of the Berlin block-
ade. We did actually negotiate a Korean truce. If our ideology
were correct, we should never have started even discussion of an
Austrian treaty. When we had straightened out all the tough
questions in a draft of that treaty, with concessions from our side,
and the Russians continued to delay with picayune technicalities,
it was easy to say, what use was all this? But then, for reasons we
do not altogether understand even now, the Soviet position
shifted, and all the prior work made possible taking advantage
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quickly of the break in the clouds. At the end of January, 1959,
for whatever reason, the Russians quit dumping tin and agreed
to an export quota.
It is hard to remember that the Russians, even the leaders,
are real people, living, breathing human beings, or (in religious
terms) capable of redemption. George Kennan's fascinating story
of our relations with Lenin and Trotsky in 1917 and 1918 are
colorful and therefore helpful. If Stalin was a monster, as
Krushchev said, he is gone, and we are back with a new leader-
ship of politicians closer to our Anglo-Saxon models, and with a
new generation coming up. Mikoyan's answers to questions of re-
porters in print and over the air waves were not so different from
some American or British politician's artful dodging. We can even
give credence to Harrison Salisbury's discerning piece in the New
York Times with the theme, Mikoyan "discovered his impres-
sions [of the United States] were badly distorted," and the head-
line "Mikoyan May Spur Fuller News of United States."
I am not urging any relaxation of suspicion, both as to mo-
tives and as to objectives. But the Vice President had it right
also in praising the firm challenge to Mikoyan by the labor lead-
ers. Refusing to meet and talk to him is puerile. Far more of us
should be able to talk or at least understand the Russian lan-
guage when we do meet him. That ability told the same skilled
reporter's ear the rude character of Mikoyan's reply when he was
asked whether Mao, Head of State in China, was now the leading
theoretician of the Communist world. The rudeness was at least
some evidence that perhaps the Kremlin is not happy about com-
munes in rural China, which the Soviet leaders don't want in
Russia. Splits among the Communists are important to us.
This requirement for keen open-minded observation at first
hand of our world neighbors, and dispassionate review of our
own convictions in regard to them applies elsewhere, too. We
cannot afford irritation and annoyance wih India, any more than
we can with Canada. We cannot take Japan for granted, any
more than we should have taken Iraq as fixed in our orbit. Can
we take business associates for granted?
Secrecy as contrasted with security is a disease in this con-
text. I was in the State Department long enough to discover that
the "leaks" came usually on items that were kept secret after
really good reasons for secrecy were gone. Keeping "secrets"
from our major allies is no way to build a firm partnership. In
the case of Britain and atomic energy, she had produced much
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss2/12
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
of the secret herself and fully collaborated on the inside of the
Los Alamos operation, under a wartime agreement to share. But
this agreement the U. S. Administration was unwilling even to
admit to Congress, when the McMahon Act was being adopted.
How do these principles of negotiation apply specifically now
in relation to Russia?
We have to begin with close observation and unemotional con-
clusions about the Soviet leaders.
I am completely convinced that given the present situation
they do not want all-out war.
This gives no promise as to what they want under other con-
ditions. It places a great burden on us to see that the relative
balance of power of defense and retaliation continues.
Clearly since we also do not want all-out war we become re-
sponsible to prevent any accidental or mistaken outbreaks that
could trigger all-out war. My assumption is that if they do not
want it either, they are assuming responsibility, perhaps only in
their own curious way, for the same objective.
This means that we should work on points of tension where
trouble could come or accidents happen. By "work on" I mean
take fresh looks and use imaginative flexibility, all within the
context of the principles we decide are really essential to the
preservation of our interests.
For instance, missile bases in Europe are sitting ducks for
Russian missiles. What do they accomplish for us? Something
perhaps, but we should be sure what it is.
With some progress at Geneva on tests, perhaps further
progress can not come at this session, but perhaps again it could
come at the next. We must never be discouraged, but press for
discussion on every front, and renew it whenever it stops.
On surprise attack we have made no headway. We sent
reasonable military people and competent scientists to Geneva.
They sent politicos, and nothing happened. Why? What are we
looking for, to prevent? There is no statement of the United
States position as yet, even though Ike is supposed to have called
down McElroy for commenting on the subject. And yet surprise
attack seems to me, on my assumptions, less of a problem than
a mistake that might send a bomb on its way. I am very happy
that bomb carrying planes are no longer winging over the Pole.
Al of this, you see, is part of the process of negotiation or
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dickering by which you get out of fixes. That process in di-
plomacy has been so downgraded that we do not understand it,
and particularly do not remember how long it takes.
Man is not "obsolete," and the old ways of living together by
accommodation are not gone. There have been world powers
long before us and the USSR, and in the days of religious war
they were as powerful relatively, as deadly, and as ill-disposed
as any today.
We can not get along with any but our strongest people at
the State Department. Gromyko, Malik, Mikoyan, Menshikov
know the United States, and young Troyanovsky is an expert
translator. Who in our foreign office knows Russia and Russians
like that? Apparently, Chip Bohlen's recall "for consultation"
evidences some consciousness of this, but unfortunately he has
gone back to the Philippines.
As you see I have said nothing about International Organi-
zation.
The United Nations is essential as a forum and framework.
All our negotiations and conversation should be related to it,
even by dragging it in. But the formation of new relationships
should be clothed in pragmatic terms adequate to meet the need,
without reference to "one world or none." If we get an agree-
ment on inspection, I do not care if the teams have no name at
all, so long as they bring Russians and others together, and, as
a very great American put it, enlarge the scope of objective dis-
course.
Let the new organization, therefore, be set up to meet the
specific needs. We would be in a tough way, even if there were
no Communists at all. The problems in economic areas, with
exploding nationalisms, would be difficult anyway, as we are
seeing in relation to the Common Market in Europe (6 countries),
and the proposed free trade area (17 countries), or in Algeria,
middle Africa, Latin America, and the Near and Far East.
It is easy in this area to find false comforts. The idea of
total disarmament may be one, and yet partial disarmament in
connection with an area of tension, as in effect we did in Austria,
may be a very worthwhile experiment.
Migration of peoples may be another possibility. I doubt if it
could solve the Polish border problem, but it did work between
Greece and Turkey, and it must be used for Arab refugees.
We hear of a new Russian generation which has no longer
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the old time Bolshevik cast. Will the Russians change, or rather
will their leaders change, in character, to the improvement of
our relations and the gradual disappearance of the cold war?
These are probably false comforts, but every one deserves a
new look, and a new try, always with both our feet squarely on
the ground of our defense policy. Mutual terror is buying us
time; let us see that we use it effectively.
Incidentally, just to cheer you up, a grave danger is that
somebody becomes convinced that he has an air-tight defense
against missiles. He might then lose his part of the mutual terror.
But probably now our gravest danger is Red China. We can-
not count on a split with Russia. My principal objection to the
Committee of One Million against Recognition of Red China is
that they apparently want us never to recognize China. They
deny it when pressed, but they would apparently permit it only
when the regime is overturned. I do not think that happens any
more, especially in China.
There are three requirements for recognition in traditional
diplomacy: De facto government; actual establishment of au-
thority over the area; and carrying out international obligations.
The first two China complies with; the third probably not.
The British have had little results from their recognition of
Peking. How much carrying out of obligations will one require?
This deserves a very careful look, from the standpoint of our
best present and long term vital interests.
Balance against the self-satisfaction of non-recognition, the
futility which we went through in two experiences while I was
in the State Department during the war, with non-recognition of
Argentina and Bolivia. Non-recognition got us nowhere. My
beloved chief, Cordell Hull, said he would never recognize the
So and Sos. But he did. We had to.
Recognition implies no admission of the morality of the new
regime, or at least it should not if it is done properly; and it may
reserve a refusal to recognize some acquisitions of territory, as
in the case of the Baltic countries.
Here again convictions must not mean absolutism.
So we are faced with a situation which is as close to life and
vital issues as those with which lawyers deal. Is there a principle
of justice and right in the world? This question is there, and we
face the kind of conviction in the opposing leaders which denies
it. Mr. Nixon said at Fordham:
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No matter how repugnant the Communist philosophy is to
us, we must recognize the fact that those who subscribe to
it are true believers. And this, rather than the military or
economic power of the Communist empire, is the major
source of its strength and its insatiable drive toward world
domination.
So we, who profess to be heirs of Greek thought and idealism,
of the Roman government of politics and accommodation, and of
the trust in one God of justice and mercy and love which comes
from our Judaeo-Christian beginnings, must believe, hold on, and
live out our convictions-and negotiate. We, and not Mr. Miko-
yan, will win this negotiation.
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